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NOTES
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AS A MEANS OF
DEFEATING THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
In the past, promissory estoppel has been used only as a substitute for
consideration. An increasing number of cases, however, have demonstrated a
willingness to employ the theory to defeat the operation of the Statute of Frauds,
thereby avoiding the consequences of noncompliance with a writing requirement. The trend has culminated in the codification of this new exception to the

Statute in section 217A of the Restatement Second of Contracts.I Since both the
original Restatement and the Restatement Second have paralleled the theories
employed by the courts, this Note will examine the growth of promissory
estoppel largely in that framework. The remedies attendant to a recovery based
on promissory estoppel will also be considered.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 217A

In 1677 the English Parliament passed an Act for the Prevention of Fraud and
Perjuries. 2 Of the original twenty-five sections, only the fourth and seventeenth
are important for contract purposes, 3 and this Note will examine only the former
section. It provided
IV. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That from and after the said
four and twentieth day of June no action shall be brought whereby to charge any executor
or administrator upon any special promise, to answer damages out of his own estate; (2) or
whereby to charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default
or miscarriages of another person; (3) or to charge any person upon any agreement made
upon consideration of marriage; (4) or upon any contract [flor sale of lands, tenements or
hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them; (5) or upon any agreement that is not
1. "(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on
the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the action or forbearance is

enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise. The remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires. (2) In
determining whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise, the following
circumstances are significant: (a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly
cancellation and restitution; (b) the definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance in
relation to the remedy sought; (c)the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evidence
of the making and terms of the promise, or the making and terms are otherwise established by clear
and convincing evidence; (d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance; (e)the extent to which
the action or forbearance was foreseeable by the promisor." Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 217A (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973). See generally 1969 ALl Proceedings 369-72.
2. 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (1677). See generally 6 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 380-84(1927)
[hereinafter cited as Holdsworth]; Costigan, The Date and Authorship of the Statute of Frauds, 26
Harv. L. Rev. 329 (1913); Hening, The Original Drafts of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II c. 3)and
Their Authors, 61 U. Pa. L. Rev. 283 (1913).
3. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 282, at 441 (1970); J. Murray, Contracts § 312, at 640
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Murray].
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to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof; (6) unless the
agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note
thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other
4
person thereunto by him lawfully authorized.

As the title of the original Act suggests, the Statute of Frauds was enacted to
prevent fraud caused by perjury.5 In 1677, trial by jury was an imperfect
procedure at best. There was little control over jury verdicts, and jurors were
free to disregard the evidence and base their decision on their own knowledge of
the facts.6 Moreover, the courts were precluded from obtaining information
from those in the best position to supply it since no person with any interest in the
result of the litigation was considered competent to testify. 7 As the laws of
evidence and contracts developed over the years, the controversy concerning the
justification for the continued existence of the Statute of Frauds has grown
stronger. Although various ingenious methods have been found to avoid the
effects of the Statute, 8 the legislatures of virtually every state have maintained
their individual statutes paralleling the English original. 9
Noncompliance with statutory requirements generally results in the unenforceability of a contract due to the Statute of Frauds. ' However, the courts
have developed a number of exceptions to the strict operation of the Statute.
Among them are (1) the doctrine of part performance,"1 (2) the imposition of
constructive trusts,' 2 (3) quasi-contracts,13 (4) the presence of fraud, 4 or
4. 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 4 (1677) (italics deleted).
5. Willis, The Statute of Frauds--A Legal Anachronism, 3 Ind. L.J. 427 (1928).
6. 6 Holdsworth, supra note 2, at 388; Murray, supra note 3, § 312, at 641; Summers, The
Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to the Statute of Frauds, 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 440, 441 (193 1) (hereinafter
cited as Summers].
7. Summers, supra note 6, at 441.
8. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 282, at 443 (1970).
9. 2 A. Corbin, Contracts § 275, at 10 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Corbin); Perillo, The Statute of
Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 39, 40 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Perillo]. A table of statutes may be found in 4 S. Williston, Contracts § S67 B (3d
ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Williston].
10. 2 Corbin, supra note 9, § 279, at 21; 3 Williston, supra note 9, § 527, at 709.
11. Part performance as the ground for requiring specific performance of an oral contract has
been applied primarily to contracts concerning land. 2 Corbin, supra note 9, § 341; Note, Statute of
Frauds-The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 170,
172-73(1967); see 3 Williston, supra note 9, § 533, at 772-73; Note, Part Performance, Estoppel, and
the California Statute of Frauds, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 281, 283-88 (1951). This doctrine (applied at its
inception exclusively to contracts for the sale of land) originated very shortly after the Statute itself"mhe statute's framers were thoroughly familiar with the part-performance problem, and the
decisions ...shortly after the passage of the Statute of Frauds... are conclusive evidence that its
framers never intended the statute to prevent the giving of equitable relief in the part-performance
cases." Costigan, The Date and Authorship of the Statute of Frauds, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 329, 344
(1913).
12. Perillo, supra note 9, at 72.
13. Id. See generally 3 Wiffiston, supra note 9, § 534.
14. 2 Corbin, supra note 9, § 341; Summers, supra note 6, at 444.
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mistake,' 5 (5) the main purpose rule, 16 (6) the joint obligor rule 7 and (7)
equitable estoppel. I8 Recently, another exception-promissory estoppel-has
received attention. Promissory estoppel was recognized in the Restatement of
Contracts, section 90:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance
of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise. 19

Section 90 can be interpreted as permitting the assertion of promissory
estoppel to bar the defense of the Statute of Frauds. However, the section taken
in its context and the early history of promissory estoppel weighed strongly
against this interpretation. 2 0 Courts have taken the position that promissory
estoppel applies only as a substitute for consideration. 21 This construction was
15. 2 Corbin, supra note 9, § 341.
16. Perillo, supra note 9, at 72. Where one promises to answer for the duty of another, some
courts hold the Statute inoperable if the promisor's "main purpose" or "leading object" is to further
his own advantage. See generally Murray, supra note 3, § 316.
17. Perillo, supra note 9, at 72. See generally 2 Corbin, supra note 9, § 361.
18. Du Bois v. Zimmerman, 28 F.2d 173 (3d Cir. 1928), noted in 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 540 (1929);
Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228N.Y. 447, 127 N.E. 263 (1920), noted in 6 Cornell L.Q. 98(1920); 2
Corbin, supra note 9, § 422A (Supp. 1971); Murray, supra note 3, § 333; Summers, supra note 6, at
445-46; Note, Statute of Frauds-The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds, 66
Mich. L. Rev. 170, 173 (1967).
There are six elements that must be established for an equitable estoppel: "1. There must be
conduct-acts, language, or silence-amounting to a representation or a concealment of material
facts. 2. These facts must be known to the partyestopped at the time of his said conduct, or at least the
circumstances must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to him. 3. The truth
concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel, at the
time when such conduct was done, and at the time when it was acted upon by him. 4. The conduct
must be done with the intention, or at least with the expectation, that it will be acted upon by the
other party, or under such circumstances that it is both natural and probable that it will be so acted
upon .... 5. The conduct must be relied upon by the other party, and, thus relying, he must be led to
act upon it. 6. He must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change his position for the worse
.... " 3 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 805, at 191-92 (5th ed. 1941) italics omitted; see I
Williston, supra note 9, § 139.
19. Restatement of Contracts § 90 (1932).
20. Note, Statute of Frauds--The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds, 66
Mich. L. Rev. 170, 177 (1967); Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 1037, 1046-49(1974). A general discussion of the
use of promissory estoppel may be found in Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle From Precedents: I
& II, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 639, 873 (1952); Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations
of the Doctrine, 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 459 (1950); Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional
Contract Doctrine, 78 Yale L.J. 343 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Henderson].
21. E.g., Kahn v. Cecelia Co., 40 F. Supp. 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). As a substitute for
consideration it was employed to make gratuitous promises enforceable. See, e.g., Ricketts v.
Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898); Siegel v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414 (1923);
Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N.Y. 1809). It was also used to insure irrevocability of certain offers.
See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958) (en bane); cf.
Northwestern Eng'r Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, I0 N.W.2d 879(1943). But see James Baird Co.
v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
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undoubtedly based on two factors. First, nowhere in section 90 was any
reference made to the Statute of Frauds. Secondly, the Restatement permitted
promissory estoppel to defeat the Statute of Frauds in a completely different
section. Commentf to section 178 stated:
A misrepresentation that there has been such satisfaction if substantial action is taken in
reliance on the representation, precludes proof by the party who made the representation
that it was false; and a promise to make a memorandum, if similarly relied on, may give
rise to an
effective promissory estoppel if the Statute would otherwise operate to
22
defraud.

Commentf deals with two situations. The first is concerned with equitable
estoppe12 3 and the second with promissory estoppel, but in a context other than
that found in section 90. Section 178 required a subsidiary promise to reduce the
main promise-the one within the Statute-to writing. A sufficient reliance on
the subsidiary promise then gave rise to an estoppel. Thus, ifA orally promised
to employB for more than one year, the promise was unenforceable, irrespective
of any reliance by B, because the promise fell within the Statute of Frauds. If,
however, A also promised to put the promise into writing, the latter promise
could, if properly relied upon, form the basis of an estoppel. 24 Promissory
estoppel, though not directly in derogation of the Statute in such cases (since the
ancillary promise is not technically within its scope 2s), had indirectly created a
large loophole. This was true since the mere addition of a subsidiary promise
would permit the enforcement of the principal one which was not otherwise
enforceable because it was within the Statute.
The origins of section 178 can be found in a 1682 English case which involved
an oral contract to assign a lease with the further promise to put the main
contract in writing. 26 The Statute of Frauds was held to be no defense due to the
presence of the subsidiary agreement.27 Some later cases decided before section
178 was written, rejected such a result, holding that whenever the main
agreement is within the Statute, so too is the subsidiary promise.28 The weight
of authority, however, was to the contrary, 29 and the majority theory was
apparently accepted as the basis for section 178.
Argument by analogy to the doctrine of equitable estoppel might prove helpful
in justifying the use of promissory estoppel to defeat the Statute of Frauds. 30 The
22. Restatement of Contracts § 178, comment f at 235 (1932).
23. See note 18 supra.
24. See, e.g., AlaskaAirlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954); Vogel v. Shaw,
42 Wyo. 333, 294 P. 687 (1930); cf. Oxley v. Ralston Purina Co., 349 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1965).

25. Obviously, the suretyship, marriage, land, and one-year sections of the Statute do not have
any impact on the ancillary promise.
26. Leak v. Morrice, 22 Eng. Rep. 883 (Ch. 1682); see McNeill, Agreements to Reduce to
Writing Contracts Within the Statute of Frauds, 15 Va. L. Rev. 553 (1929).
27.

22 Eng. Rep. at 883.

28. Little v. Union Oil Co., 73 Cal. App. 612, 238 P. 1066 (Ist Dist. 1925); Green v. Pennsylvania
Steel Co., 75 'Ad. 109, 23 A. 139 (1891); Sarkisian v. Teele, 201 Mass. 596, 88 N.E. 333 (1909).
29. See McNeill, Agreements to Reduce to Writing Contracts Within the Statute of Frauds, 15
Va. L. Rev. 553, 558-59 & n.27 (1929). Further examples may be found therein.
30. The former depends upon a misrepresentation of an existing fact, see note 18 supra, while the
latter requires a promise concerning future intent.
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use of equitable estoppel to prevent a person from setting up the Statute as a

defense is justified by well accepted principles. First, the part performance
doctrine, which originated very shortly after the Statute, is itself based on

equitable estoppel. 31 Secondly, the prevention of inequitable utilization of the
Statute of Frauds through the use of equitable estoppel aids "the ultimate

function of the statute in preventing fraud."'32 Thirdly, equity has always

abhorred the harsh operation of statutes. 33 These same arguments may, by
analogy, be applied to promissory estoppel 34 -the first since part performance is,
in fact, a species of promissory estoppel, 35 and the second and third since
promissory estoppel is also an equitable doctrine. 36 Acceptance of this position
must ultimately lead to the conclusion that promissory estoppel should receive as
broad an application as that given to equitable estoppel.
The Restatement Second, section 217A, 37 has given support to this view and
generally permits promissory estoppel to enforce the main promise, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, even in the absence of an ancillary promise
to reduce the agreement to writing. 38 The language of this section is nearly
identical to section 90 of the originalRestatement39 and calls for enforcement "if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." However, a
comment to section 217A notes that "the requirement of consideration is more
easily displaced than the requirement of a writing."'40 Subsection two of section

217A lists five factors to be used in determining whether injustice can be avoided

only by enforcement of the promise. 4 1 "Each factor relates either to the extent to

which reliance furnishes a compelling substantive basis for relief ...or to the
extent to 'which the circumstances satisfy the [various] functions [of the Statute of
Frauds]. 42
31. F. Pollock, Contracts 521-22 (Winfield ed. 1950); Summers, supra note 6, at 447; cf., e.g.,
Kinsell v. Thomas, 18 Cal. App. 683, 124 P. 220 (3d Dist. 1912); Zelzer v. Yorkville Park Co., 141
Misc. 190, 192, 252 N.Y.S. 626, 629 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
32. Summers, supra note 6, at 447.
33. Id.
34. But see Note, Statute of Frauds-The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of
Frauds, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 170, 177 (1967).
35. See text accompanying note 105 infra; cf. Summers, supra note 6, at 447 & n.22. However,
the part performance doctrine long preceded promissory estoppel, and has its own set of rules. J.
Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 327 (1970); Murray, supra note 3, § 333. Arguably, the great
overlap between part performance and promissory estoppel, especially as to the reliance element,
makes any distinction between the two seem highly arbitrary.
36. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents: I, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 639, 642-44
(1952). For a discussion of the equitable origin of promissory estoppel, see Annot., 48 A. L.R.2d 1069
(1956).
37. See note I supra.
38. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
39. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
40. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 217A, comment b (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
41. Id. § 217A(2), supra note 1.
42. Id. § 217A, comment b. The most important functions of the Statute include the following: (a)
Evidentiary function-To supply and preserve evidence of the contract; (b) Cautionary functionTo give the parties advance warning of the consequences of their agreement; (c) Clarifying function-
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A number of cases had taken a stance similar to that of section 217A by holding
that the main promise of performance, rather than the ancillary
agreement to
43
execute a writing, is the promise which induces reliance.
II.

USE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL TO DEFEAT

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Many courts have refused to employ promissory estoppel to circumvent the
Statute of Frauds 44 because of the fear that oral evidence, if not excluded by the
Statute, often would be perjurious. 45 However, given the proper circumstances, 4 6 most jurisdictions now appear willing to protect promisees who,
in detrimental
reliance upon a promise, have incurred "unconscionable in7
jury.

'4

The "unconscionable injury" test is commonly associated with Monarco v. Lo
Greco.48 Cross-complainant's mother and stepfather stated that if he stayed
home and worked on the farm, it would be conveyed to him upon the death of the
survivor. In reliance upon the promise, he gave up business and educational
opportunities. The stepfather reneged on the agreement by leaving his share of
the property to his grandson. The grandson was estopped to assert the
(testamentary) Statute. The court noted:
The doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute of frauds has been consistently applied by
the courts ... to prevent fraud that would result from refusal to enforce oral contracts in
certain circumstances. Such fraud may inhere in the unconscionable injury that would
result from denying enforcement of the contract after one party has been induced by the
other seriously to change his position in reliance on the contract, or in the unjust
enrichment that would result if a party who has received
the benefits of the other's
49
performance were allowed to rely upon the statute.
To permit harmonization of previously unrealized points of disagreement. See generally Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 800-04 (1941); Periilo, supra note 9, at 53-58,
64-69.
43. These cases arose primarily in California, based on Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P.
88(1909). See, e.g., Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950); Maddox v. Rainoldi,
163 Cal. App. 2d 384, 329 P.2d 599 (1st Dist. 1958).
44. Seavey, Reliance upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 913, 923-24
(1951) [hereinafter cited as Seavey]; see, e.g., Kahn v. Cecelia Co., 40 F. Supp. 878 (S.D.N.Y. 194 1);
Keller v. Penovich, 262 So. 2d 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic
Hosp., Inc., 173 So. 2d 492, 495 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1965); Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 45111.
App. 2d 10, 17, 195 N.E.2d 250, 253 (3d Dist.), aff'd, 31 11. 2d 507, 202 N.E.2d 516 (1964); cf. 21
Turtle Creek Square, Ltd. v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 432 F.2d 64 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971); Trollope v. Koerner, 106 Ariz. 10, 18, 470 P.2d 91, 99
(1970); Heyman v. Adeack Realty Co., 102 R.I. 105, 108, 228 A.2d 578, 580 (1967).
45. See text accompanying note 5 supra. However, "it has been successfully argued that refusal
to admit [oral] evidence causes the Statute of Frauds... to be a trap; if the evidence is dear and
convincing ... [it] is admissible .... Whether one agrees or disagrees with the result reached very
largely depends upon what is thought about the efficacy of the Statute of Frauds.. . as a means of
preventing fraudulent swearing." Seavey, supra note 44, at 924.
46. See notes 56-64 infra and accompanying text.
47. Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 626, 220 P.2d at 739-40 (citations omitted).
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Both unconscionable injury and unjust enrichment were found to exist.
The vast majority of subsequent cases have employed only the formerunconscionable injury-as the threshold criterion for determining the propriety
has apparently been
of the application of promissory estoppel. 50 The latter
51
quasi-contracts.
in
role
traditional
its
to
relegated
The remedial guise under which the promisor is estopped to plead the Statute
is frequently obscured by decisions which fail to distinguish adequately between
3
promissory estoppel and either equitable estoppel"2 or part performance.S
Nonetheless, cases may be reliably categorized as being based on promissory
estoppel for two reasons. First, equitable estoppel depends upon arepresentation
as to an existing fact,5 4 while future intention is the key element in promissory
estoppel." Secondly, part performance requires no unconscionable injury in
order to operate.
The majority of the cases involving estoppel and the Statute of Frauds have
dealt with employment contracts within the one year Statute of Frauds. An
example is where an employer has orally promised a job whereupon the
employee, in reliance, changes his residence and/or his job. The mere change of
residences 6 or job relinquishment will generally prove to be insufficient 57
50. See, e.g., Standing v. Morosco, 43 Cal. App. 244, 184 P. 954, 955 (2d Dist. 1919). See also 24
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 347 (1967).
51. See generally D. Dobbs, Remedies § 4.1 (1973).
52. E.g., Lucas v. Whittaker Corp., 470 F.2d 326(10th Cir. 1972); Oxlcy v. Ralston Purina Co.,
349 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1965); Montgomery v. Moreland, 205 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1953); Ruinello v.
Murray, 36 Cal. 2d 687, 227 P.2d 251 (1951); McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 469 P.2d 177
(1970); Pursell v. Wolverine-Pentronix, Inc., 44 Mich. App. 416, 205 N.W.2d 504(1973); Westerman
v. Cityof Carlsbad, 55 N.M. 550, 237 P.2d356(1951); Gainesv. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 78
N.J. Super. 168, 188 A.2d 179 (App. Div. 1963); St. Louis Trading Co. v. Barr, 168 Okla. 184, 32
P.2d 293 (1934); Stevens v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 264 Ore. 200, 504 P.2d 749 (1972); see
Henderson, supra note 20, at 377, 381.
53. At least one jurisdiction has been especially derelict. See, e.g., Norman v. Nash, 102 Ga.
App. 508, 116 S.E.2d 624 (1960); Dameron v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 56 Ga. App. 257, 192 S. E.
446 (1937); Alexander-Seewald Co. v. Marett, 53 Ga. App. 314, 185 S.E. 589 (1936).
Part performance is regarded as an extension of equitable estoppel, and in many cases the elements
of both exist simultaneously. See 3 Williston, supra note 9, § 533, at 782-83; Summers, supra note 6,
at 447 n.22.
The failure of the courts to adequately distinguish promissory estoppel from either equitable
estoppel or part performance is due to the fact that equitable estoppel and part performance are much
more established in the law, and courts are loathe to establish new exceptions. "The doctrine of
(equitable] estoppel is as old as the statute of frauds, and, as such, a part of the law of the land."
Taylor v. Zepp, 14 Mo. 339,346 (1851). See note 11 supra concerning the age of the part performance
doctrine.
54. See note 18 supra. But see J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 166 (1970).
55. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
56. The employee who changes his residence must not benefit thereby. 24 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
347, 349-50(1967); see Standing v. Morosco, 43 Cal. App. 244, 184 P. 954 (2d Dist. 1919)(move from
New York City to Los Angeles may have been "an agreeable one'); B.F.C. Morris Co. v. Mason, 171
Okla. 589, 39 P.2d 1 (1934) (per curiam) (Danville to Oklahoma City).
57. Note, Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in California, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 590, 601
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Statute of Frauds in California]; see 24 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 347, 350
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"[u]nless it can be shown that the plaintiffs rights under the previous contract
were so valuable that unconscionable injury would result if the oral contract
were not enforced." 58 Where this has, in fact, occurred, promissory estoppel
provides the best basis of relief because the restitutionary remedy of quantum
meruit considers only defendant's gain, but not plaintiff's loss due to reliance,
which may be called his reliance interest.5 9
A number of other cases have involved contracts to make wills, especially
where the defendant promises to make a particular testamentary disposition if
the promisee renders services to the defendant, or transfers property (not
necessarily inter vivos) to a designated person. Promises of the first type are often
remedied by restitution, 60 except where the services are incapable of valuation
because they are peculiar or personal as in a family relationship. 6' Since the
defendant will not usually be the beneficiary of promises of the second type,
restitution is inappropriate, and promissory estoppel is frequently employed to
62
enforce the contracL
With the exception of brokerage cases, where the Statute of Frauds has
consistently received strict construction, 63 other types of cases dealing with the
applicability of promissory estoppel to other parts of the Statute are too limited in
64
number to serve as a basis for generalization.
(1967); e.g., McLaughlin v. Ford Motor Co., 269 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1959); Sinclair v. Sullivan
Chevrolet Co., 45 Ill.
App. 2d 10, 195 N.E.2d 250, affd, 31 Ill. 2d 507, 202 N.E.2d 516 (1964);
Westerman v. City of Carlsbad, 55 N.M. 550, 237 P.2d 356 (195 1); St. Louis Trading Co. v.Barr,
168 OkIa. 184, 32 P.2d293(1934). But see, e.g., Sessionsv. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 47 Cal. App.
2d 611, 118 P.2d 935 (2d Dist. 1941); Harmon v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 79 Nev. 4,377 P.2d 622
(1963).
58. Statute of Frauds in California, supra note 57, at 601; see, e.g., Lucas v. Whittaker Corp.,
470 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1972) (relinquished fringe benefits and sold custom built house); Ruinello v.
Murray, 36 Cal. 2d 687, 227 P.2d 251 (1951) (resigned lifetime job); Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal.
782, 106 P. 88(1909) (quit secure job); Pursell v. Wolverine-Pentronix, Inc., 44 Mich. App. 416, 205
N.W.2d 504 (1973); Perry v. Norton, 182 N.C. 585, 109 S.E. 641 (1921). Absent such exceptional
injury attendant to a resignation, even the added factor of residence change %%illnot remove the case
from the Statute. Marston v. Downing Co., 73 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1934); cf., e.g., Tanenbaum v.
Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., 173 So. 2d 492 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1965). But see, e.g., AlaskaAirlines
Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954); Montgomery v. Moreland, 205 F.2d 865 (9th Cir.
1953); Fibreboard Prods., Inc. v. Townsend, 202 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1953); Tuck v. Gudnason, II Cal.
App. 2d 626, 54 P.2d 88 (1st Dist. 1936); McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 469 P.2d 177 (1970);
Gaines v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 78 N.J. Super 168, 188 A.2d 179 (App. Div. 1963).
59. See generally J. Calamari & J.Perillo, Contracts § 238 (1970); D. Dobbs, Remedies § 4.1
(1973). But see Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1208, 1212-15
(1973).
60. See, e.g., Kobus v. San Diego Trust & Sav. Bank, 172 Cal. App. 2d 574, 342 P.2d 468 (4th
Dist. 1959); Palmer v. Phillips, 123 Cal. App. 2d 291, 266 P.2d 850 (2d Dist. 1954).
61. Statute of Frauds in California, supra note 57, at599; see, e.g., Monarco v.Lo Greco, 35 Cal.
2d 623, 220 P.2d 737 (1950); Maddox v. Rainoldi, 163 Cal. App. 2d 384, 329 P.2d 599 (st Dist. 1958).
62. See, e.g., Redke v. Silvertrust, 6 Cal. 3d 94, 98 Cal. Rptr. 293, 490 P.2d 805, cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1041 (1971); Day v. Greene, 59 Cal. 2d 404, 29 Cal. Rptr. 785, 380 P.2d 385 (1963).
63. See, e.g., Pacific Southwest Dev. Corp. v. Western Pac. RR., 47 Cal. 2d 62, 301 P.2d 825
(1956); Heyman v. Adeack Realty Co., 102 R.I. 105, 228 A.2d 578 (1967). But see United Farm
Agency v. McFarland, 243 Ore. 124, 411 P.2d 1017 (1966).
64. For example, the typical suretyship transaction does not induce sufficient reliance to justify
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III. RELIEF UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
There is a vast body of case law which discusses and applies promissory
estoppel in its traditional context as a substitute for consideration. 65 Yet neither
these cases nor the ones concerning the Statute of Frauds present any
meaningful discussion of what the theory of recovery should be.66 However, at
least one proposition is well settled. The Statute does not preclude a restitutionary recovery of the benefits conferred under an oral contract where the
defendant fails to perform his part of the agreement. 67 Beyond restitution,
however, the question is whether awards of promisees' reliance or expectation
interests are ever proper. 68 Reliance recovery is limited to what generally
amounts to actual out of pocket expenses. Its "object is to put [the promisee] in as
good a position as he was in before the promise was made. '69 An expectation
award would yield full contract damages in an attempt "to put the plaintiff in as
enforcement of an oral guaranty. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 217A, comment c (Tent.
Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973). ButseeJohnH. Pelt Co. v. American Cas. Co., 513 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1974) (promise to provide performance bond relied upon by builder who proceeded to perform
under contract).
From the few cases that do appear under the various real property Statutes of Frauds one thing is
clear-the mere performance of such acts as are normally attendant upon the closing of tile
transaction, including making a down payment or taking possession, is not going to constitute such
reliance as to estop the promisor from asserting the Statute. See, e.g., National Resort Communities,
Inc. v. Cain, 479 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Aubrey v. Workman, 384 S.W,2d 389 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1964) (mortgagor vacated property in connection with promise by mortgagee to release
him from mortgage); Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956) (moved onto premises).
Beyond that, the decisions go both ways. Compare Lacy v. Wozencraft, 188 Okla, 19, 105 P.2d 781
(1940) (promissory estoppel might be found to defeat the Statute of Frauds where tenant remodeled
premises) with Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953) (adjacent tract bought in
reliance).
65.
See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
66. Note, Promissory Estoppel-Measure of Damages, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 705, 707 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Measure of Damages]; see Henderson, supra note 20, at 378.
67. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1-2), 46 Yale L.J. 52, 373,
386-87 (1936-37) [hereinafter cited as Fuller & Perdue]; Restatement of Contracts § 355 (1932). "[Ilf
[the defendant] fails to perform [his oral contract] he is under an enforceable duty to make restitution
of the value received." Id. § 355, comment b. This concept is embodied in the Restatement Second
as well. "[Tihe remedy of restitution is not ordinarily affected by the Statute of Frauds ....
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 217A, comment d (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973). A similar
provision will appear in the revised section 355. See id.
It is interesting to note that even the party in breach may, under certain circumstances, be entitled
to a limited restitutionary recovery. See D. Dobbs, Remedies § 13.2, at 964-65 (1973).
68. The two categories are examined in detail in Fuller & Perdue, supra note 67, at 52-57.
69. Id. at 54; Comment, Once More into the Breach: Promissory Estoppel and Traditional
Damage Doctrine, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 559 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Traditional Damage Doctrine].
This position has been advocated in Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?, 35 Mich. L.
Rev. 908, 942-45 (1937). Some authors have reached this result by analogy to tort principles. See
Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 22-23 (1932)
[hereinafter cited as Gardner]; Seavey, supra note 44, at 926. "Estoppel is basically a tort doctrine and
the rationale of the section is that justice requires the defendant to pay for the harm caused by
foreseeable reliance upon the performance of his promise." Id.
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good a position
as he would have occupied had the defendant performed his
70

promise.

Theoretically, the Statute does bar any per se recovery of the expectation
interest. 7' The doubtful question for many years had concerned the reliance
interest. Objection to such recovery had been raised on the ground that neither
contract nor tort law provided an appropriate cause of action .7" Even more
important was the argument that reimbursement for reliance on the oral contract
would violate the Statute. However, the same theoretical inconsistencies apply
with equal force to the application of restitution in circumvention of the Statute.
A resolution of this problem may be obtained by considering both the reliance
and restitutionary recoveries to be founded upon a rescission of the contract, so
that there would be, in effect, no suit "on the contract.17 3 This justification for
the existence of a reliance recovery may be fine for pure theorists, but judges
seem more amenable to a rationale based on need. Courts have recognized a
reliance interest recovery when they have considered the injustice which must
necessarily beset either plaintiff or defendant if the choice is an all or nothing
74
recovery.
A number of cases seeking to avoid this all or nothing choice have provided
reimbursement for reliance under promissory estoppel. 5 For any number of
reasons, however, the vast majority of decisions have opted for protection of
expectancies under promissory estoppel.7 6 A number of arguments may be
advanced to justify such a result.
70. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 67, at 54; Traditional Damage Doctrine, supra note 69, at 559.
See Henderson, supra note 20, 378-79; Comment, The Measure of Damages for Breach of a Contract
Created by Action in Reliance, 48 Yale L.J. 1036 (1939); Measure of Damages, supra note 66, at 709.
71. But-see -notes 76-81 infra and accompanying text. There is little doubt that today, at a
minimum, the reliance interest, as strictly construed, is recoverable. See notes 74-75 infra and
accompanying text.
72. But see Gardner, supra note 69, and Seavey, supra note 44.
73. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 67, at 387-88.
74. Id. at418-20. Despite theoretical inconsistencies, courts have generally awarded expectation
interests in Statute of Frauds cases, thereby implicitly affirming the contract. See note 76 infra and
accompanying text. However, where courts determine the contract to be unenforceable and
restitution is not appropriate because the defendant was not unjustly enriched, see note 59 supra and
accompanying text, and if reliance interests are not compensable, no recovery would be available.
It has been argued over the years, however, that the concept of restitution, which today protects
against defendant's unjust enrichment, was originally intended to, and should in fact, protect the
plaintiff's reliance interest. See Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context, 73 Colum. L. Rev.
1208, 1219-26 (1973). Promissory estoppel seems to have been necessary to fill this void.
75. See, e.g., Associated Tabulating Serv., Inc. v. Olympic Life Ins. Co.. 414 F.2d 1306(5th Cir.
1969); Perry v. Norton, 182 N.C. 585, 109 S.E. 641 (1921); Cooper Petroleum Co. v. LaGloria Oil &
Gas Co., 436 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1969).
76. See, e.g., Lucas v. Whittaker Corp., 470 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1972); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v.
Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954); Montgomery v. Moreland, 205 F.2d 865 (9th Cir 1953);
Redke v. Silvertrust, 6 Cal. 3d 94, 98 Cal. Rptr. 293, 490 P.2d 805, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041
(1971); Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621,220 P.2d 737 (1950); Seymourv. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782,
106 P. 88 (1909); Sessions v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 47 Cal. App. 2d 611, 118 P.2d 935 (2d Dist.
1941); McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 469 P.2d 177 (1970); Pursell v.Wolverine-Pentronix,
Inc., 44 Mich. App. 416, 205 N.W.2d 504 (1973); Harmon v. Tanner MotorTours, Ltd., 79 Nev. 4,
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At the time of the drafting of the original Restatement, Williston felt that full
77
contract damages were appropriate in actions based on promissory estoppel.
His view arguably was the one adopted, since nowhere in the section on contract
damages in the original Restatement78 is there any suggestion that a different
treatment was required for cases involving promissory estoppel, 79 nor do any of
its sections appear to regard the reimbursement of reliance damages alone as a
proper subject in and of itself.80 In addition, section 90 is listed under the
subchapter "ContractsWithout Consideration" thereby lending further support
to the position that ordinary contract damages should be available. Finally, the
bulk of the cases have upheld such grants. 8 '
Recoveries in several major cases will be analyzed in an effort to determine
whether they truly support protection of expectancies or reliance. Although these
cases deal with promissory estoppel in its role as a substitute for consideration,
and not in the context of the Statute of Frauds, they should still prove invaluable
in determining the courts' attitudes in the latter area.
In Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 82 plaintiff sought to take over an existing
automobile dealership. He was told that the franchise could be obtained if he
purchased the assets of the deceased former dealer, thereby discharging
Chrysler's moral obligation to the widow. Plaintiff acquired sole control, after
which defendant breached. The court awarded full contract damages-not only
reliance expenses, but also lost profits.
In Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.,8 3 the prospective grantee of a grocery
store franchise bought a small store of his own, during the course of negotiations,
in an effort to familiarize himself with this type of operation. He sold the store at
the request of the defendant, who subsequently demanded an increased capital
377 P.2d 622 (1963); Carlsen v. Carlsen, 49 N.J. Super. 130, 139 A.2d 309 (1958); McKay Prods.
Corp. v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 385, 283 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. 1967); In re Field's
Estate, 11 Misc. 2d 427, 172 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sur. Ct. 1958); Stevens v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 264
Ore. 200, 504 P.2d 749 (1972).
There is no irreconcilable clash between the cases. Reliance damages will generally be the measure
of recovery where the expectancy is too indefinite to prove. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts
§ 210 (1970). Thus, assuming there to be sufficient certainty as to the value of the expectancy interest, the question is whether the court may limit damages to a reliance recovery.
77. 4 ALI Proceedings (Appendix) 98-99 (1926). "Either the promise is binding or it is not ....I
could leave this whole thing to the subject of quasi-contracts so that the promisee under those
circumstances shall never recover on the promise but he shall recover such an amount as will fairly
compensate him for any injury incurred; but it seems to me that you have to take one leg or the other.
You have either to say the promise is binding or you have to go on the theory of restoring the status
quo." Id. at 103-04.
Corbin, however, preferred a more flexible case by case analysis, with an upper limit of the full
value of performance. 1 Corbin, supra note 9, § 205. See also Fuller & Perdue, supra note 67, at
401-06.
78. Restatement of Contracts §§ 327-46 (1932).
79. 65 Mich. L. Rev. 351, 352 (1966).
80. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 67, at 401-02.
81. See, e.g., cases cited at note 76 infra.
82. 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123 (1958).
83. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965), noted in 51 Cornell L.Q. 351 (1966).
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contribution from plaintiff as a condition to acquisition of the franchise. The
court granted a monetary award, but on its face the decision appeared to refuse
to grant lost profits. 84 However, analysis of the award of reliance damages
reveals that the expectancy interests were included in it, 8s and the case may
therefore be said to be in accord with Chrysler.
Goodman v. Dicker8 6 involved a plaintiff applying for a dealer franchise to sell
radios. Such franchises were revocable at will. He was informed that his
application had been accepted, and was induced to incur expenses. In addition,
he was informed that he would receive an initial delivery of at least thirty radios.
The defendant was held liable on an estoppel theory for monies spent by plaintiff
in preparation for business. However, he was not held liable for any lost profits
on the thirty radios because there was not sufficient reliance to create an
estoppel. 87 Even if a contract had been formed, the defendant would not have
been liable for lost profits since it was uncertain that the radios could have been
sold at a profit. Under traditional contract rules there is no recovery for lost
profits (i) when a contract is terminable at will, (ii) when a contract involves a
new business, the alleged profits of which would have been highly speculative, or
(iii) when the plaintiff was placed "in a better position than he would have
occupied had the contract been fully performed." 8 8 Proponents of Goodman's
apparent "no lost profits" rule found reinforcement in Wheeler v. White,8 9
where the court, having found no contract to exist, strictly limited plaintiff's
possible recovery under promissory estoppel to out-of-pocket expenses. 90
These cases thus illustrated three potential approaches to the damage
question. One approach, following Chrysler and Hoffnan, would reimburse
promisees for lost expectancies. 9 1 A second, as in Goodman, would limit
recovery to protection of the reliance interest when confronted with contractual
infirmities. 92 A third, following Wheeler, would deny absolutely recovery for lost
profits.

93

Section 90 of the Restatement Second implicitly contrasted Chrysler and
Goodman, emphasizing the fact that in the former, the promisee was deliberately
misinformed. 94 Arguably, therefore, the section seemed to support the proposi84.

26 Wis. 2d at 700, 133 N.W.2d at 276.

85. Traditional Damage Doctrine, supra note 69, at 585.
86. 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
87. See Terre Haute Brewing Co. v. Dugan, 102 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 1939).
88. Traditional Damage Doctrine, supra note 69, at 586-87; Measure of Damages, supra note 66,
at 709-10.
89. 398 S.W.2d 93, 94-95 (Tex. 1965), noted in 18 Baylor L. Rev. 546 (1966).
90. 398 S.W.2d at 97. Indefiniteness was the particular contractual infirmity at issue.
91. See, e.g., Wroten v. Mobil Oil Corp., 315 A.2d 728, 730-31 (Del. 1973); Hessler, Inc. v.
Farrell, 226 A.2d 708, 711 (Del. 1967); Haveg Corp. v. Guyer, 226 A.2d 231, 238 (Del.1967).
92. See Terre Haute Brewing Co. v. Dugan, 102 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 1939).
93. Cf., e.g., Green v. Helmcamp Ins. Agency, 499 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. 1973); Prince v. Miller
Brewing Co., 434 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Pasadena Assoc. v.Connor, 460 S.W.2d 473
(Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
94. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90, illus. 8 & 9 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
Corbin made no reference to this aspect of Chrysler in his analysis of the case. See I Corbin, supra
note 9, § 205.
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tion that reliance damages only are the proper measure of recovery, except where
the promisor has acted in bad faith, in which case the expectation interest should
be the measure. 9 5
However, given the nature of promissory estoppel as a substitute for
consideration, 96 the expectancy result is more theoretically correct. Where the
other necessary elements of a contract are present a contract must then exist with
promissory estoppel substituting for the requisite consideration; and therefore full
contract damages should be available. In cases which involve promissory
estoppel as it affects the Statute of Frauds, however, consideration is assumed to
be present.9 7 In such cases expectancy damages unquestionably would be
awarded, unless there are other policy reasons which would require a different
result. The overwhelming majority of decisions apparently have found no such
policy justifications to bar an expectancy recovery.9 8
Although the cases provide no insight into the appropriate measure of
recovery, the language of the Restatement Second, which contains a redraft of
the original section 90, may provide some insight. The principal change in
section 90 (which change was also incorporated into the newly created section
217A) was the recognition of the possibility of partial enforcement. 99 The
requirement set forth in the original section 90 that reliance be of a "definite and
substantial character" was deleted. The section was further amended by
providing that "[t]he remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice
requires." Section 90 now recognizes that
the same factors which bear on whether any relief should be granted also bear on the
character and extent of the remedy. In particular, relief may sometimes be limited [as]

measured by the extent of the promisee's reliance rather than by the terms of the
promise. 100

It is this language, rather than that emphasizing the good faith-bad faith
dichotomy 01 that should serve as the basis for determining whether reliance or
95. See Traditional Damage Doctrine, supra note 69, at 588; 65 Mich. L. Rev. 351, 357 (1966).
96. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
97. This is so except, perhaps, in the rare instance where promissory estoppel is used both as a
substitute for consideration and also to estop the promisor from pleading the Statute. See Henderson,
supra note 20, at 381.
98. See note 76 supra and accompanying text. But see Henderson, supra note 20, at 381. "Since It
is established doctrine that the Statute of Frauds is to be 'strictly applied,'it would seem to follow that
the elements of Section 90 will also be 'strictly applied,' in this context." Id. at n.2 10. See generally 37
Calif. L. Rev. 151 (1949).
99. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90, Reporter's Note (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
100. Id. § 90, comment d (emphasis supplied).
This language, indicative of a similar flexible approach when dealing with the Statute of Frauds,
also appears in comment d to section 217A.
The extent of reliance required for full enforcement, however, may vary according to the type of
situation involved. For example, charitable subscription cases do not require substantial reliance,
but suretyship cases do. Id. § 90, comment b.
Further discussion of the ramifications of the flexible approach in section 90 type circumstances
would not be appropriate since it has been discussed elsewhere. See generally Henderson, supra note
20, at 352-57; Traditional Damage Doctrine, supra note 69, at 580-82; 65 Mich. L. Rev. 351, 354-55.
101. See notes 94-95 supra and accompanying text.
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expectancy damages are proper. This would seem to be true if for no other reason
than the fact that the language quoted above appears explicitly in the section and
its comments, while the dichotomy is only implied. Moreover, since the
expectancy result is theoretically correct, the good faith-bad faith approach is
inappropriate in that it limits drastically, and perhaps unreasonably, such
awards.
The question that has received no attention until now is whether section 217A
was intended by its drafters to provide a more restrictive approach to relief than
that which exists under section 90, despite the apparent similarities of the two
sections. The only clue that the remedial results were not intended to be
co-extensive is lodged in a comment to section 217A which states that the
consideration requirement is more easily displaced than is the writing requirement. 10 2 However, this seems to be more of a threshold question than an
operational issue. In other words, the extent of reliance required to invoke
section 217A may be somewhat greater, but once that criterion is satisfied, the
remedy should be given as freely as it would under section 90.
Another argument that the expectancy interest is appropriate under section
217A is that specific performance is available under that section.10 3 Such
argument is based on a desire for theoretical consistency. Both the awards of lost
profits and specific performance affirm the existence of the contract and protect
expectancy interests-one through damages and the other through performance.
In fact, there are indications that specific enforcement, when available, is the
preferred remedy under section 217A.10 4
Further support for the expectancy result is that the remedy of specific
performance is based on part performance which is, in reality, a species of
promissory estoppel. 105 The conduct which is the subject of part performance
has traditionally been required to be "unequivocably referable" to the contract,
while reliance under promissory estoppel need satisfy no such requirement. It
appears, however, that this is no longer the rule. The wording of section 197 has
now been changed to parallel that of section 2 17A, at least insofar as the kind of
conduct in reliance is concerned. 10 6 Perhaps the drafters of theRestatemnent have
102. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 217A, comment b (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973). See
text accompanying notes 99-100 supra.
103. See note 104 infra.
104. "[When specific enforcement is available under the rule stated in § 197, an ordinary action
for damages is commonly less satisfactory.... Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 217A. comment
d (Tent.Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
105. J. Calamari & J.Perillo, Contracts § 101, at 174 (1970), citing Greiner v. Greiner, 131 Kan.
760, 293 P. 759 (1930).
106. Compare the following"Where, acting under an oral contract for the tranfer of an interest in land, the purchaser with the
assent of the vendor (a) makes valuable improvements on the land, or (b) takes possession thereof or
retains a possession thereof existing at the time of the bargain, and also pays a portion or all of the
purchase price, the purchaser or the vendor may specifically enforce the contract." Restatement of
Contracts § 197 (1932).
"A contract for the transfer of an interest in land may be specifically enforced notwithstanding
failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds if it is established that the party seeking enforcement, in
reasonable reliance on the contract and on the continuing assent of the party against whom
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finally taken into consideration what they themselves have admitted-that the
conduct generally required to invoke the part performance doctrine is not that
called for under any part of the contract, but is any reasonable conduct indicating
a sufficient degree of reliance on a promise.' 07 At least one case has reached the
same result. In Steadman v. Steadman, 10 8 the defendant agreed to convey her
interest in a house to the plaintiff in consideration of£ 1500, plus X 100 for
maintenance arrears. Plaintiff sent only the latter amount with a deed of
transfer, which defendant refused to sign. The court held the acts sufficient part
performance to enforce the oral contract. 109 This new flexibility in the doctrine of
part performance, closely following that existing under promissory estoppel, has
added weight to the notion that part performance is a species of promissory
estoppel. This link is of importance since it appears that part performance as a
ground for remedy against a Statute of Frauds defense has evolved to the point
where damages as well as equitable relief may be available under that
doctrine.' 1 0 Once specific performance is available under the Statute of Frauds,
the reasoning appears to be that it is a relatively minor breach in the already
cracked wall of the Statute to allow damages."' Since part performance is a
species of promissory estoppel, and full damages may be available under part
performance, it is arguable that such damages should also be recoverable under
promissory estoppel.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although section 217A itself has yet to be construed by the courts, the use of
promissory estoppel to defeat the Statute of Frauds has become widespread and
occurs under a multitude of guises.
Full contract damages have been shown to be justified primarily on the basis of
the failure of the Restatement to take a contrary approach, the assertions of its
draftsmen, the availability of specific performance as an alternative remedy, and
the measure of damages recoverable in cases dealing with promissory estoppel as
a substitute for consideration.
The increasing availability of full contract damages and/or specific perenforcement is sought, has so changed his position that injustice can be avoided only by specific
enforcement." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 197 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973). See the
language of section 217A at note 1 supra.
Section 197 concerns only contracts for the transfer of an interest in land. However, such contracts
constitute by far the largest category to which specific performance has been applied.
107. " 'Part performance' . . . is not a strictly accurate designation of such acts as taking
possession and making improvements.. ." when the contract does not provide for such acts, but such
acts regularly bring the doctrine into play. Restatement of Contracts § 197, comment b (1932).
108. [1974] 3 W.L.R. 56, noted in 90 L.Q. Rev. 433 (1974).
109. A commentator noted that "[i]t is now necessary to unlearn all the authorities which hold
that equivocal acts, and in particular the mere payment of money, cannot suffice ... " 90 L.Q. Rev.
433, 434 (1974).
110. See Miller v. McCamish, 78 Wash. 2d 821, 829-30, 479 P.2d 919, 924 (1971), noted In 47
Wash. L. Rev. 524 (1972).
111. 47 Wash. L. Rev. 524, 527-28 (1972).
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formance seems to be a well justified development, since reliance damages alone
may not always provide sufficient compensation to avoid unconscionable injury,
the avoidance of which was of primary importance in the creation of the doctrine
of promissory estoppel.
Jeffrey G. Steinberg

